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Hugo Black was one of the most enigmatic of a notably enig-
matic generation of New Deal Southern Democrats that rose to 
national power in the thick of this century. Lyndon Johnson had 
his towering contradictions, but even those did not surpass 
Black's. The same man who joined the Ku Klux Klan in his na-
tive Alabama later joined the Warren Court's rulings ordering an 
end to desegregation. The same man hailed as the Supreme 
Court's greatest civil libertarian wrote the Court's opinion up-
holding the confinement of Japanese-Americans during World 
War II, one of the greatest civil liberties disasters in our history. 
The same man who came to the Court to prevent the judiciary 
from frustrating the will of the majority became its most ardent 
defender of the rights of the minority. Oddest of all, perhaps, is 
that this least trained of Supreme Court Justices, who prior to his 
appointment had never held a legal post higher than that of Jef-
ferson County (Ala.) solicitor, emerged as its dominant intellec-
tual force and most avid student of constitutional history. 
Raw ambition explains much of LBJ's incongruities.t Judi-
cial biographies remind us that judges have ambitions, too, par-
ticularly judges who, like Black, come from a background in 
electoral politics. While Roger K. Newman's new biography2 is 
not rich in legal philosophy or historiography, it tells us much 
about Black the man, and in the process much about Black the 
* This review was prepared while the author was an associate at Paul, Weiss, 
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison in New York City. 
** Research Scholar, New York University School of Law. 
1. See generally, Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power 
(Alfred A. Knopf, 1982); Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent 
(Alfred A. Knopf, 1990). 
2. Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography (Pantheon Books, 1994). 
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JUnst. First captivated by the raw power of Black's opinions in 
1967, Newman spent a good part of the next quarter-century at 
work on this biography, interviewing thousands of Black's rela-
tives, former clerks, Alabama political associates and even, in 
1969, Black himself. The result is a thoroughly informed and 
highly readable study, filled with illuminating detail yet also 
graced with a perspective that keeps attention focused on the 
truly significant aspects of Black's fascinating life. 
Newman's biography is especially timely because, in many 
ways, Black is back in vogue. Though Black was a political lib-
eral, he never shared the philosophical relativism and pragma-
tism that shaped the outlook of the great Northern-educated 
liberal judges such as Holmes, Hand, Cardozo, and Brandeis. 
Black's unusual commitment to the power of legal texts and be-
lief in immutable principles make him seem an oak in a forest of 
rootless judicial pragmatists. He is frequently invoked in that 
spirit today by advocates of judicial restraint, mainly on the right, 
who believe that the American tradition of judicial pragmatism 
leaves too much discretion in the hands of judges. 
Newman-who persuaded Congress to issue a stamp in 1986 
commemorating the 100th anniversary of Black's birthJ-does 
not disguise his admiration for Black. The quotation from Emer-
son with which Newman opens the book evinces his belief in 
Black's greatness: "If a single man plant himself on his convic-
tions and then abide, the huge world will come round to him."4 
But despite his obvious affection for Black, Newman is also a 
skillful, honest and at times sardonic reporter of the facts of 
Black's life, which he often uses to undermine Black's claims of 
conviction, and which make the Emerson epitaph seem more 
than a little ironic. As a new generation debates the relative 
merits of judicial formalism and judicial pragmatism, it is worth 
considering the evolution of Black's jurisprudence and the 
strength and significance of his convictions outside the four cor-
ners of his opinions and in the light shed by his personality, life 
experiences, and aspirations. 
I 
"I'm just a Clay County hillbilly," Black liked to say, refer-
ring to his roots in the Alabama backcountry.s One is reminded 
of the character from "Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer," the Satur-
3. Newman, Hugo Black at 628 (cited in note 2). 
4. Id. at ix. 
5. Id. at 3. 
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day Night Live skit from a few years back, who, awakening after 
thousands of years, transforms into a wily and highly successful 
American trial lawyer. "I'm just a caveman," Unfrozen 
Caveman Lawyer told juries, affecting unsophisticated humility. 
In neither his case nor Black's was the self-effacement warranted. 
Charming, cunning, combative, and full of energy, Black 
(like Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer) was a trial lawyer. Through-
out his life he remained, Newman observes, "an advocate down 
to his bones. "6 His formal legal education consisted of a two-
year program at the University of Alabama law school, to which 
he was "apparently admitted in violation of [the school's] regula-
tions," not having attended an undergraduate institution or taken 
the necessary examinations.7 Graduating at age 20, Black went 
on to become the leading personal injury lawyer in Birmingham, 
Alabama, mainly representing injured workers in suits against 
corporations. "The courtroom was his theater," writes Newman. 
"He bluffed and gambled .... He used facial expressions-a 
smirk, grimace or raised eyebrow, a tense or eager look .... He 
moved around confidently and purposely," striking "a pose of 
confident humility .... He tried to make jurors feel not that he 
was a great showman, but that he just had a great case. "s Black 
likely was the only Supreme Court Justice who took an aptitude 
test that found him best suited to be an actof.9 
Populism and racism made for a dangerous brew in the Bir-
mingham of the 1920's, a working-class city known as "the Pitts-
burgh of the South."to At the same time Black was making his 
6. Id. at 354. 
7. Id. at 18, n*. 
8. Id. at 55. 
9. Id. 
10. See Paul Hemphill, Leaving Birmingham: Notes of a Native Son 15-26 (Viking 
Press, 1993) ("Leaving Birmingham"). Birmingham was bustling and prosperous in these 
days, the third-largest city in the South. World War I perked up factory production, and 
the boom continued after the war. But 
lurking deep below the surface, like a latent volcano smoldering and building its 
strength toward some cataclysmic day of reckoning, there was another Birming-
ham. Of (the] 310,000 people in the metropolitan area, 133,000 were black-the 
highest percentage of blacks in any North American city of 100,000 or more. 
They were the sons and daughters of slaves and sharecroppers, and even though 
they were one-half of the work force, they held the most menial jobs, as domes-
tics, yardmen, simple laborers. They lived in a thoroughly segregated society, in 
scores of shaggy communities dismissed as "Niggertown," and shared not at all 
in the city's periods of good fortune. In 1910, when there were 19,000 white 
children in public schools and a like number of blacks, the white schools were 
valued at $1,374,000, the black schools at only $81,680. To be sure, life was any-
thing but a dream for black people in the other large southern cities, such as 
Memphis, Atlanta, and New Orleans; but in Birmingham, a gritty town of mus-
cle and very little gentility and grace, segregation was maintained with great 
vigor. 
424 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 12:421 
mark, a baseball radio broadcaster by the name of Theophilus 
Eugene Conner-nicknamed "Bull" for his ability to shoot the 
bull on the air-was also acquiring a reputation as a friend of the 
Birmingham workingman.u Black was a populist and, although 
Newman convincingly debunks any notion that he was a racist, 
Black was not above making blatantly racist appeals to all-white 
Protestant Birmingham juries. Defending a Protestant minister 
accused of murdering a Catholic priest who had married the min-
ister's rebellious daughter off to a Puerto Rican laborer, Black 
paraded the bridegroom before the jury under Klieg lights 
designed to highlight his dark complexion. Black also read from 
the official KKK prayer in his summation. The jury found that 
the minister had acted in self-defense.12 Black also successfully 
defended a white man who, taking justice into his own hands, 
avenged his brother's murder by killing a black tenant farmer 
named Luke Ware on the courthouse steps moments after Ware 
(astonishingly enough) was acquitted by a white jury. "[A] tear 
roll[ing] down his cheek," Black invoked the ancient tradition 
making it the duty of the oldest son to avenge the killing of an-
other family member. After the verdict, Black was more prosaic. 
He told his client, who had thanked God for his victory: "Don't 
thank Him. Thank me. God knows you're guilty."t3 
Black's reputation, and income, grew rapidly. But his sights 
were set not on acquiring great wealth but on acquiring high 
political office. Accordingly, Black did what almost all politically 
ambitious Alabamans did in the 1920's: he joined the local 
"klavern" of the KKK, the Robert E. Lee Klan No.1. The Invis-
ible Empire was then very visible in Birmingham. The ceremony 
at which Black and 1,500 others were inducted in 1923, in front of 
"large flaming crosses," took place in a public park and was re-
ported in the Birmingham News.t4 Later Black minimized his 
involvement, but Newman shows that Black, in fact, was an ac-
tive Klansman, an officer who initiated new members, spoke at 
Klan meetings around the state in full Klan regalia, and marched 
ld. at 25-26. 
11. ld. at 106-07. 
12. Newman, Hugo Black at 81-85 (cited in note 2). 
13. Id. at 118-21. 
14. Id. at 91-92. KKK initiation ceremonies 
were gala family outings: whole lazy days filled with boating and picnicking and 
dancing at city parks, drawing crowds as J~rge as so.~. capped as ~arkness fell 
by the sight of as many as 1,750 men steppmg forward m hooded white sheets to 
be publicly welcomed to the Klan in the eerie light of a burning cross. Forty 
years later, their distant heirs would dynamite a black church, killing four little 
girls, plunging Birmingham into a nightmare without end. 
Hemphill, Leaving Birmingham at 26 (cited in note 10). 
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in parades.ts Newman also demolishes Black's suggestions over 
the years that he joined the Klan casually, much like one would 
become a Rotarian, in order to enhance his law practice. It was, 
instead, a calculated decision to get ahead politically.16 Black 
had, it seems, planted himself squarely-but on his ambitions, 
not his convictions. 
Newman does argue, as did Black at times, that joining the 
KKK was simply an unavoidable fact of Alabama politics in the 
1920's.n But not all Southern politicians made the same choice 
Black did. James F. Byrnes, for example, refused the invitation 
of the South Carolina Klan in 1924, and as a result lost his cam-
paign for the Senate that year.ls But Byrnes won election to the 
Senate six years later, after the Klan's popularity crested and the 
Depression began, and went on to become a major figure in the 
Roosevelt Administration and, briefly, a colleague of Black on 
the Supreme Court. Black's nearest rival in the 1926 primary, 
John H. Bankhead, did not join the Klan, but was elected Ala-
bama's second senator in 1930, defeating the Klan's candidate, 
the virulently anti-Catholic J. Thomas Heftin.19 A premise of 
Black's subsequent First Amendment jurisprudence was that pol-
iticians should not capitulate to the passions of the moment. Yet 
that was what Black did when he joined the Klan. 
With the Klan's strong backing-Black's friend, the Grand 
Dragon of Alabama, was "campaign manager in everything but 
name"2o-Black won a tight Democratic Senate primary in 1926. 
At a Klan victory celebration, he acknowledged his debt, thank-
ing the Grand Dragon and his fellow members "from the bottom 
of a heart that is yours. "21 1\vo terms in the Senate proved him 
an ardent and loyal New Dealer, who advanced economic reform 
proposals more radical than the Roosevelt Administration's, 
strongly supported Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, and led an 
investigation into corporate lobbying practices that drew harsh 
criticism, not all of it from conservatives, for its partiality and 
strong-arm tactics.22 
Black hardly cut a Solomonic figure. His only prior judicial 
experience was an eighteen-month stint as a municipal police 
15. Newman, Hugo Black at 94 (cited in note 2). 
16. Id. at %-100. 
17. Id. at 99-100. 
18. David Robertson, Sly and Able: A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes 91-94 
(Norton, 1994). 
19. Newman, Hugo Black at 102, 139-40 (cited in note 2). 
20. Id. at 104. 
21. Id. at 116. 
22. ld. at 154-61, 175-94, 209-14. 
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court judge when he was in his mid-20s. But then Franklin 
Roosevelt was not looking for moderation and judiciousness in 
his first appointment to the Supreme Court. The President was 
looking for revenge, against a Senate that had unexpectedly re-
belled at his Court-packing plan. In Black, Roosevelt found "the 
perfect vehicle for retaliation"23: an ideologically pure, often ex-
treme, liberal whose membership in the Senate nonetheless as-
sured a swift and easy confirmation by his colleagues (so swift 
and easy, in fact, that Black's prior membership in the Klan did 
not come up at all in the confirmation proceedings and only be-
came a national controversy after Black was confirmed). 
II 
The Supreme Court was never Black's goal. The White 
House was. One of Newman's most interesting revelations is 
that it was a goal Black continued to pursue even after his ap-
pointment to the Court. "He never lost his desire to be presi-
dent," Newman writes.24 "There was no way you could tell him 
he wasn't going to be president," a journalist friend said. "He 
just had it in his head. "25 According to Alabama political associ-
ates, Black agreed to go on the Court hoping it would be a step-
pingstone to the Presidency.26 
According to Newman, Black twice nearly succeeded. Not 
in 1940-memories of the KKK controversy were still too fresh 
for Roosevelt seriously to consider running with Black, though 
the idea was discussed and Black even told Roosevelt he was 
prepared to resign from the Court.27 (Newman also reports, 
mysteriously and without elaboration, that Black considered run-
ning against Roosevelt for President in 1940.28) In 1944, how-
ever, as Henry Wallace was being dumped from the Democratic 
ticket, New Deal power-broker Tommy Corcoran told Black that 
"[w]e've got labor and the liberals lined up for you" and that the 
vice-presidential nomination "is yours if you want it." Black de-
clined because of his wife's poor health at the time.29 Had he 
decided differently and been elected Vice President, of course, 
the buck would have stopped with him, not with Harry S Tru-
man, after Roosevelt's death the following year. 
23. ld. at 236. 
24. ld. at 306. 
25. Id. at 309, n•. 
26. ld. at 235, n*. 
27. Id. at 306-07. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 309. 
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In 1948, at age 62, Black took one last shot. He went back 
home to Alabama to discuss a possible Presidential bid with 
longtime political allies. With conservatives in control of the 
state party and dissatisfaction growing among Southern Demo-
crats over the national party's emerging commitment to civil 
rights, the response was uniformly negative. Black took the ad-
vice, again, Newman says, missing a golden opportunity. For ac-
cording to Truman intimate Clark Clifford, Truman was having 
second thoughts about running at the time and, had he known of 
Black's interest, would have stepped aside.3o 
Newman's account seems vastly to overstate Black's chances 
in both 1944 and 1948. Roosevelt and his closest advisors (Cor-
coran, by that time, was not among them) did not want a South-
erner on the ticket in 1944. Jimmy Byrnes, who had not joined 
the Klan, was vetoed as a possible candidate because of feared 
opposition from liberals and blacks.31 It hardly seems likely that 
Black, given his past, would have merited greater consideration. 
Black is not mentioned in David McCullough's account of the 
1944 vice-presidential machinations in his recent biography of 
Truman. Nor does McCullough mention Black as a possible 
Presidential contender in 1948, and in fact he argues that by the 
beginning of 1948 Truman was determined to run.32 (Truman 
did, however, offer the vice-presidential nomination in 1948 to 
Black's colleague, Justice William 0. Douglas, who turned it 
down.33) 
Nevertheless, Black's Presidential aspirations during his first 
11 years on the Court do raise an obvious and important ques-
tion: Did they exert any influence on his behavior as a Justice? 
Unfortunately, it is a question that Newman does not explore. 
Moreover, it is impossible from Newman's account to gauge the 
seriousness of Black's ambition for national office, whether it 
was a constant passion, part of his daily mental life, or a passing 
fancy that struck every four years only to fade with the election 
season. Some tentative observations seem fitting. 
If a part of Black, during this time, was running for national 
office from the Court, logically one would expect him to have 
had at least three goals in mind. He ought to have wanted to 
defuse any concerns among liberals about his membership in the 
Klan; to compile a strong voting record in favor of labor, a pow-
30. Id. at 383-84. 
31. David McCullough, Truman 297, 311-12 (Simon & Schuster, 1992). 
32. ld. at 584-86. 
33. ld. at 635, 637. 
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erful Democratic constituency; and to avoid alienating the in-
cumbent Democratic Presidents, who were best situated to offer 
him a vice presidential nomination. In fact, all three tendencies 
may be observed in Black's voting record and opinions during his 
early years on the Court. (One also would have expected him to 
keep up his political contacts, and there is evidence of this, too: 
Black continued to see Roosevelt and socialize with other mem-
bers of the Administration, he gave political advice, he lunched 
occasionally with the Alabama congressional delegation, he was 
honored by a liberal group at a huge dinner featuring much of 
political and official Washington and, as World War II came to a 
close, he spoke publicly about foreign policy.34 In these extraju-
dicial activities Black was not much different from the other 
Roosevelt appointees.3s) 
Soon after Black was appointed, Chief Justice Charles Evan 
Hughes, to allay the public's suspicions over Black's racial views, 
assigned him several cases overturning the convictions of black 
defendants in the South.36 Black became the Court's "Southern 
civil rights expert. "37 In 1940, he wrote for a unanimous Court in 
Chambers v. Florida,3B reversing the convictions and death 
sentences of four blacks who were coerced into confessing to a 
crime. Although Black at first resisted the assignment, he then 
poured his heart into it-"There's been no case which I put more 
work in" -and produced a masterpiece.39 The protections of 
due process, he declared, were "deliberately planned and in-
scribed for the benefit of every human being subject to our Con-
stitution-of whatever race, creed or persuasion."40 The opinion 
drew the highest praise from editorial writers across the country, 
even from papers that had blasted Black for his KKK ties less 
than three years before. "Any doubts about Black's commitment 
to the Constitution and civil liberties were quickly stilled."41 
34. Newman, Hugo Black at 303, 305-08, 333, 377-78 (cited in note 2). 
35. See generally, Bruce Allen Murphy, The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection: The 
Secret Political Activities of Two Supreme Court Justices (Oxford U. Press, 1982). 
36. Merlo J. Pusey, 2 Charles Evans Hughes 773-74 (MacMillian, 1951). See Pierre 
v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939) (systematic exclusion of blacks from jury pools violates 
equal protection clause); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (coercing confession of 
murder violates due process); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1939) (reversing conviction of 
black farmhand who confessed to rape charges after being whipped by "Texas Rangers"). 
37. Edwin McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court As Conducted by Chief 
Justice Hughes, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 5, 18, n.21 (1949). 
38. Chambers, 309 U.S. at 227. 
39. Newman, Hugo Black at 281-82 (cited in note 2). 
40. Chambers, 309 U.S. at 241. 
41. Newman, Hugo Black at 283 (cited in note 2). 
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The Flag Salute cases of the early 1940's, in which the Court 
did an about-face in just three years, gave Black another oppor-
tunity to distance himself from the Klan's intolerance. Black 
joined the Court's initial 8-1 decision, issued shortly before its 
1940 Summer recess, which held that Jehovah's Witnesses could 
be forced to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance in 
public schools.42 The decision was met with a firestorm of criti-
cism by liberal commentators and 171 leading newspapers across 
the country.43 According to a scrapbook kept by Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, who authored the Court's initial decision, Justice 
Douglas returned after the recess and told Frankfurter that Black 
had changed his mind, because "he has been reading the pa-
pers."44 Newman charges that Frankfurter "invented" this con-
versation; the charge is not inherently implausible, but Newman 
inexcusably provides no citation or explanation for it.45 (The 
Douglas conversation is reported as a fact in last year's biogra-
phy by Gerald Gunther of Judge Learned Hand.46) Whether or 
not he was tailoring his views to the prevailing winds of public 
opinion, Black, as well as Douglas and Justice Frank Murphy, 
soon announced, in an "extraordinary public statement" in a case 
that did not raise the same question, that they had changed their 
position.47 The next year the Court overruled the 1940 decision, 
leaving a bitter Frankfurter in dissent.48 
Labor could have found no fault with Black during this time. 
He consistently voted for expansive interpretations of the newly 
enacted federal labor laws.49 He dissented in cases limiting the 
authority of the National Labor Relations Board, not alone, but 
notwithstanding the disagreement of other liberal Justices.so In a 
celebrated 1945 case that came up in the midst of a national coal 
strike, Black and Douglas apparently asked Murphy, who was 
writing the majority opinion adopting the miners' interpretation 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, to rush preparation of the opin-
42. Minersville Sch. DisL v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
43. H.N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfuner 152-53 (Basic Books, 1981). 
44. Id. at 152. 
45. Newman, Hugo Black at 298 (cited in note 2). 
46. Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge 564 (Alfred A. Knopf, 
1994). 
47. ld. See Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623-24 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting). 
48. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 646 (1943). 
49. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing 
Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318 (1940); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940). 
~0. ~ee NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 265-68 (1939) (Black, 
1., d1ssentmg); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332,346 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting); 
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 200-08 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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ion so that it might influence ongoing negotiations between the 
Government and the miners' union.s1 
Union picketing frequently appeared on the Court's docket 
in the 1940's. Black voted in each of five cases in the early '40s to 
find such picketing protected by the First Amendment.sz At 
least at the level of generality, this record does not seem consis-
tent with Black's later refusal to extend protections to picketing, 
sit-ins and other forms of protest by civil rights demonstrators in 
the 1960's. "Picketing," Black wrote in one such case in 1965, 
"though it may be utilized to communicate ideas, is not speech, 
and therefore is not of itself protected by the First Amend-
ment."s3 Discussing the civil rights cases, Newman explains that 
Black "abhorred violence above all and would do anything in his 
power to prevent even the merest possibility of its occurrence. "s4 
Yet that was the same objective of a Frankfurter opinion in a 
1941 decision, sustaining an injunction against union picketing 
"set in a background of violence" during a labor dispute.ss Black 
nonetheless dissented, finding the connection between the pick-
eting and the violence too tenuous, and adopting as the polestar 
of decision the imperative of protecting free speech, "as impor-
tant to the life of our government as is the heart to the human 
body."s6 
The early Black was exceedingly deferential to the authority 
of the Federal Government. In 1938 he was the sole dissenter 
from a decision holding that the Agriculture Department failed 
to accord procedural due process before fixing maximum com-
mission rates for the sale of livestock.s7 (Justices Louis D. Bran-
deis and Harlan F. Stone joined the majority opinion.) In 1942 
he concurred specially to emphasize that judicial review of rate-
fixing orders issued by the Federal Power Commission be "the 
51. Newman, Hugo Black at 333-35 (cited in note 2). The case was Jewell Ridge 
Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of Am, 325 U.S. 161 (1945). 
52. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Loca/802 v. Wahl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942) 
(Black joining Douglas' concurrence); Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 
U.S. 722, 729 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting); Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago Local 
753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 2f!7, 299 (1941) (Black, J. , dissenting); Ameri-
can Fed'n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 
(1940). 
53. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 578 (1965) (Black, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
54. Newman, Hugo Black at 550 (cited in note 2). 
55. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 312 U.S. at 294. 
56. Id. at 302 (Black, J., dissenting). It was not until 1949 that Black sustained an 
injunction against labor picketing. Giboney v. Empire Storage & lee Co., 336 U.S. 490 
(1949). 
57. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 22 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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barest minimum" consistent with Congress' instruction to the 
courts to review such orders.ss In 1944 he agreed that Congress 
could validly restrict the right of a meat dealer to challenge the 
constitutionality of regulations issued by the Office of Price Ad-
ministration for enforcing compliance with wartime price con-
trols.s9 (Liberals Frank Murphy and Wiley B. Rutledge 
dissented.) If there was a case of major importance in which 
Black disagreed with the Roosevelt Administration, Newman 
does not discuss it.6o Black did not, however, typically bow to 
exercises of Presidential authority throughout his career. He 
wrote the Court's opinion holding that President Truman went 
too far in ordering, without congressional authorization, the 1952 
seizure of the nation's steel mills to prevent an industry strike 
from interfering with prosecution of the Korean War.61 
Moreover, in the most important civil liberties case during 
Black's first few years on the Court, Black sided not with civil 
rights but with the Roosevelt Administration. By a 6-3 vote, the 
Court in Korematsu v. United States62 refused to find unconstitu-
tional the uprooting of more than 100,000 persons of Japanese 
descent living on the West Coast-the vast majority loyal Ameri-
can citizens-and their internment behind barbed wires for more 
than two years. In the Chambers case Black wrote: "Under our 
constitutional system, courts stand against any winds that blow as 
havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because 
they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-
conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement. "63 But 
that conviction did not extend to the Japanese minority blown 
from their homes and their lives by the winds of wartime hyste-
58. Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 608 (1942) 
(Black, J., concurring). 
59. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
60. The closest is United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942), in 
which Black, writing for the Court, held that the Government could not recover allegedly 
unconscionable profits earned by a shipbuilding contractor during World War I. (The 
Government's suit, though pressed by the Roosevelt Administration, actually was initi-
ated in the 1920's.) Though refusing to adopt the Government's creative theories for 
avoiding its contractual obligations, Black's opinion nonetheless expressed "indignation" 
at war profits and declared that the opportunities war presents for profiteering "have 
been too often scandalously seized." Id. at 308, 309. The opinion concluded by sug-
gesting various ways for Congress to "meet this recurrent evil." Id. at 309. In fact, Black 
said that he voted in the contractor's favor because that was "the best way to stop" the 
Government from continuing with the contract system that had produced this result. 
"[Black's] opinion was a letter to Congress to take action," says Newman, which Congress 
subsequently did. Newman, Hugo Black at 289 (cited in note 2). 
61. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
62. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
63. Chambers, 309 U.S. at 241. 
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ria. Indeed, Newman writes that "Black wanted to immunize the 
military completely from judicial review during wartime" 
(although Black's opinion for the Court did not go so far).64 
Black had already begun groping toward the absolutist, no-ex-
ceptions interpretation of the Bill of Rights which would become 
his trademark and its accompanying skepticism about govern-
mental predictions that disaster would result unless liberty was 
curtailed.6s But in Korematsu, he wrote that, although legal re-
strictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect, "[p]ressing public necessity" may nonethe-
less justify them66; and he accepted at face value the military's 
claim that there was no alternative to this odious discrimination. 
Had Black and Douglas, the Court's most reliable civil liber-
tarians, voted differently in Korematsu, they would have changed 
the outcome. Korematsu would not "lie[] about," as Justice 
Robert Jackson feared in his dissent, "like a loaded weapon 
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a 
plausible claim of an urgent need."67 (Thankfully, Korematsu 
does not look as potent a weapon today as it did then, having 
been subjected to withering attack over the years, though from 
outside rather than inside the Court. A Presidential Commission 
concluded in 1983 that the decision "lies overruled in the court of 
history."68) Douglas in fact initially planned to dissent, but was 
talked into joining the majority by Black.69 Although the posi-
tion Black and Douglas took no doubt diminished their standing 
in the liberal community, it seems reasonably clear that taking 
the opposite position would have had worse consequences for 
any future political career. A condemnation by the Court of the 
Japanese-American internment program would have been a slap 
in the face to President Roosevelt, who personally approved the 
program; and it would have been immensely unpopular in Cali-
fornia, an important part of the Democrats' national electoral co-
alition. It is impossible not to speculate that Black's and 
64. Newman, Hugo Black at 316 (cited in note 2). 
65. "Narrow abridgments have a way of broadening themselves," Black wrote in a 
draft opinion in 1941. Newman, Hugo Black at 290, n• (cited in note 2). Courts must 
"scrutinize legislation with zealous eyes whenever it is challenged as an infringement of 
the rights constitutionally declared to be inviolable," he had commented on a colleague's 
draft opinion. ld. at 283. 
66. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
67. Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
68. Peter Irons, Justice at War: The Story of the Japanese American Internment Cases 
372 (U. of California Press, 1983). 
69. Newman, Hugo Black at 317 (cited in note 2). 
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Douglas's seemingly uncharacteristic votes in Korematsu may 
have been influenced by these considerations. 
I do not mean to suggest by any of this that Black made 
calculated decisions during his early years on the bench to jetti-
son his personal beliefs in favor of positions that would better 
serve his political ambitions. There is no evidence to sustain that 
suggestion. It also bears great emphasis that Black's positions in 
these cases accorded with his basic ideological and political out-
look. He was a liberal; he was sincerely committed to civil liber-
ties; he had always fought, as a private lawyer and a Senator, on 
behalf of labor; he genuinely revered Roosevelt and believed in 
his policies. In the Korematsu case, there was an additional fac-
tor: Black was personal friends with General John L. De Witt, the 
West Coast Commander who had ordered and overseen the 
evacuation programJO No doubt Black's faith in DeWitt's judg-
ment, if not a sense of personal loyalty, colored his decisionmak-
ing in Korematsu. 
But the influence of ambition on reason is usually more sub-
tle. It can be the puff of wind that imperceptibly pushes analysis 
in one direction rather than another, the unseen pebble that tilts 
the scales this way or that. It is by no means clear that Black's 
presidential aspirations influenced his actions as a Supreme 
Court Justice even in this limited sense. But the topic seems wor-
thy of further inquiry in any complete assessment of his life and 
legacy. Of all the many factors that tug at a judge's conscience in 
deciding cases, personal political advantage should not be among 
them. The Framers tried to create the most independent judici-
ary, one in which there would be neither "unwillingness to haz-
ard the displeasure" of the political branches nor "too great a 
disposition to consult popularity."11 Black himself reacted with 
disdain to the frequent rumors identifying Douglas as a potential 
presidential or vice-presidential candidate. "That Douglas then 
would even think of leaving the Court to run for office upset 
Black," writes Newman.72 "Once someone is appointed to this 
court," Black said, "he should stay here. "73 Yet these "noble 
thoughts," Newman notes, "never stilled Hugo's own political 
ambitions"; the rule was one he found easier to apply to others 
than to himself.74 It would be ironic indeed if the Justice who 
70. ld. at 235, 313-14. 
71. Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 464, 471 
(Mentor, 1961). 
72. Newman, Hugo Black at 329 (cited in note 2). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 329, 383. 
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urged unyielding obedience to the intentions of the Framers de-
parted from this most basic of their teachings in his own life on 
the bench. 
III 
Black was appointed primarily to help stop the Court's use 
of substantive due process to block implementation of the 
Roosevelt Administration's economic reforms. Substantive due 
process was "why I came on the Court," Black later said. "I was 
against using due process to force the views of judges on the 
country."7s Even before Black arrived at the Court in the Fall of 
1937, however, this battle was basically over. That spring Justice 
Owen Roberts, in the famous "switch in time that saved nine," 
began voting to sustain New Deal legislation. 
But a new battleground soon emerged: the scope of the 
Constitution's protections of personal freedoms against Govern-
ment interference. As more Roosevelt appointees replaced de-
parting conservative justices, it was a battle pitting New Dealers 
against New Dealers, chiefly Black against Felix Frankfurter, ex-
FDR Braintruster and Harvard law school professor. And 
Black, ironically enough, became a champion of an expansive in-
terpretation of the Bill of Rights to prevent the democratically 
elected branches from infringing upon individual liberties in the 
name of society's interests. After a mere four years on the 
Court, Black's "initial doubts about the legitimacy of judicial re-
view had almost completely evaporated."76 
Many other liberals underwent a similar transformation. 
What is peculiarly interesting about Black is the jurisprudential 
position he advanced, and articulated so passionately, in support 
of his views. Black was fully aware of the Court's significance in 
American life. "You and 1," he wrote Douglas in 1941, "know 
that the Court has the last word on questions of law which are 
determinative of questions of public policy upon which the 
course of our Republic depends."77 Yet Black's exercise of this 
power was rooted in a judicial philosophy that sought to deny its 
existence. To Black the Constitution spoke in absolutes. He ab-
horred judicial "balancing," in which the interests of society are 
weighed against the interests of the individual under the circum-
stances of a given dispute. He read legal texts literally. When 
the Framers wrote that "Congress shall make no law ... abridg-
75. ld. at 277. 
76. Id. at 286. 
77. ld. 
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ing the freedom of speech, or of the press," to Black that meant 
no law.7s For years Black carried on his person a "dog-eared, 
almost frazzled and all-marked-up copy" of the Constitution, 
which he would invariably reach for in the midst of debate. ("Of 
course," Newman wryly notes, "it was a prop, just for show, com-
pletely unnecessary, since he had memorized the Constitu-
tion."79) Black also decorated his textual analyses with copious 
historical references to the circumstances leading to the Constitu-
tion's adoption and to the intent of the Framers. 
Black's philosophy remains of special interest today because 
the current Supreme Court finds itself in a similar debate be-
tween text-bound, rule-oriented formalists and advocates of a 
more freewheeling judicial pragmatism. But Black's methodol-
ogy has now been appropriated by more conservative judges and 
scholars. In the 1980's it was Edwin Meese and Robert Bork that 
proclaimed fidelity to the "original intent" of the Framers as the 
only legitimate method of constitutional interpretation. If one 
were to pick a jurisprudential (as opposed to an ideological) dis-
ciple of Black on the current Court, it would be Justice Antonin 
Scalia. Scalia, joined by other conservative jurists, insists that the 
text be the determinative guide in both constitutional and statu-
tory interpretation. He opposes balancing with a fervor equal to 
Black's and urges the Court to fashion clear and definite rules 
whose application is not highly sensitive to varying factual cir-
cumstances.so Other Justices favor indeterminate standards over 
bright-line rules and seek to interpret statutes and the Constitu-
tion in accordance with their perceived purpose instead of their 
literal meaning. The clash between the two positions has figured 
prominently in several recent decisions and excited widespread 
scholarly attention.s1 
At the core of both Black's absolutism and Scalia's textual-
ism is a belief that judges need to be constrained in exercising 
their judgment in deciding legal issues. To permit balancing is to 
invite judges to impose their own personal views about how the 
balance should be struck between competing societal values. It 
is to cede too much control to unelected and unaccountable offi-
cials over the content of public policy and individual freedom. 
The job of judges in a constitutional democracy should be to en-
78. U.S. Const., Amend. I. 
79. Newman, Hugo Black at 568 (cited in note 2). 
80. See generally, Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1175, 1179-85 (1989). 
81. See generally, Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: 
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22 (1992). 
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force the will of others. Of course, for Black this most often 
meant enforcing what he perceived as the will of the Constitu-
tion's Framers to limit governmental action, whereas for Scalia it 
usually means deferring to the decisions of the democratically 
elected branches of government. But the basic principle remains 
the same: depriving judges of the ability to shape the contours of 
our law on the basis of their personal preferences. 
When people as strong-willed as Hugo Black-or, for that 
matter, Antonin Scalia-present themselves as passive enforcers 
of the will of others, mere conduits through which flow the cur-
rents of constitutional democracy, a hard-headed realism ought 
to take hold. Scalia's biography hasn't yet been written, but 
there is plenty of evidence in Black's that factors of personality 
and strategy played as great a role in determining Black's philos-
ophy as any desire to avoid imposing the will of judges, including 
his own, on our law. 
Absolutism came naturally to Black because he was a man 
of absolutes-it was, if you will, his personal preference. Great 
trial lawyers know how to project 100% certainty in the rightness 
of their cause. Black was a great trial lawyer and never ceased 
being one. "Try as he did," observes Newman, "he could not get 
advocacy out of him-just as no one, despite every best attempt 
in the world, can remove one's past."sz The constitutional history 
he brought to bear "was an advocate's history: he proved too 
much and ignored or swept away all doubtful evidence. "83 
Throughout his career, Black lived in a world of black and 
white-of heartless employers and maimed employees, of rapa-
cious utilities and defrauded consumers. He relished a good 
fight; "crusading was in his bones. "84 Before going on the Court, 
Black feared that life there "would be dull. "8s From his first 
Term, in which he filed lone dissents a record eight times, to his 
later years, when he found himself increasingly in dissent from 
the Warren Court's expansive interpretations of the Constitution, 
Black made sure he would not be bored. "In dissent his creative 
urge found an outlet. "86 That Black developed the provocative 
philosophy he did is one of the least surprising things about him. 
On a psychological level, Black's denial of the judge's role in 
constitutional interpretation may have served an important func-
tion. Judges were Black's antagonists as a trial lawyer and a New 
82. Newman, Hugo Black at 354 (cited in note 2). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 275. 
85. Id. at 235. 
86. Id. at 275. 
1995] UNFROZEN CAVEMAN JUSTICE 437 
Deal senator. Time and again Black saw the verdicts he won 
before Alabama juries thrown out or cut down by the Alabama 
appellate courts.s7 The District of Columbia Supreme Court 
stopped his Senate committee from subpoenaing telegrams that 
passed between business interests Black was attacking and a 
prominent Chicago corporate law firm, a ruling Black denounced 
as "malicious."88 And of course, like every liberal of his genera-
tion, Black experienced first-hand the Supreme Court's excesses 
in blocking economic reform. Every bone in his body rebelled 
against the notion of judicial power. His textualism and absolu-
tism allowed him to eat his judicial activism and have it too: he 
could lead a Court that fundamentally changed American society 
while denying that judges were doing anything but the Framers' 
bidding. Thus when asked, in a 1968 television interview, about 
criticism of the Warren Court's decisions restricting police meth-
ods, Black could reply, with great sincerity if little realism: "Well, 
the Court didn't do it. ... The Constitution-makers did it."s9 
Nor can Black's philosophy be isolated from the internal 
struggle among the Roosevelt appointees for control of the 
Court. In Felix Frankfurter Black found a worthy combatant. 
Frankfurter came to the Court believing he would become its in-
tellectual leader. He underestimated both his colleagues' own in-
tellectual powers and their determination-especially Black's-
to leave their own mark on the Court's history. Gradually over 
the years, Black's absolutism emerged as the antithesis of Frank-
furter's thesis that judges must balance the needs of society 
against individual liberties and, in all but exceptional circum-
stances, find the former controlling. "To no small degree," New-
man notes, the two "helped to define each other and the history 
of the Court during the time they served together. "90 Absolu-
tism was a way for Black to fight Frankfurter on Black's own 
terms. Frankfurter's jurisprudence depended on careful ball con-
trol and intricate zone defenses that used principles of federal-
ism, institutional competence, and concern for the Court's 
credibility as a shield against judicial activism. Black countered 
with a kind of jurisprudence by slam dunk. WHAM! The au-
thors of the Civil War Amendments intended to make all the 
protections of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states, so there 
was no use debating which ones were more fundamental and less 
87. Id. at 59-60. 
88. Id. at 187-88. 
89. Id. at 585. 
90. Id. at 483. 
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suited to state control than others. WHAM! The First Amend-
ment protected speech absolutely and without exception, so 
there was no use debating the strength of the state's reasons for 
limiting speech in any particular instance. 
Newman also observes that Black's absolutism was a "rhe-
torical tactic. "91 He quotes a story Black told of a Senatorial col-
league who would introduce two bills-"the one he wanted 
passed, and another that made the first one seem conserva-
tive."92 Black did not apply his absolutism absolutely. He read 
the Constitution literally, Newman concludes, "[w]hen it served 
his end."93 Black never, for example, held that the Contracts 
Clause, prohibiting states from "pass[ing] any . . . . Law impair-
ing the Obligation of Contracts," meant any law.94 Nor was he 
keen on enforcing, or even studying the origins of, the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.9s Nor, for that matter, did the fact that the First 
Amendment specifies only that "Congress shall make no law" 
stop him from applying it to acts of the executive or judicial 
branches infringing upon free speech. Moreover, even in those 
areas Black believed to be governed by absolutes, the judicial 
judgments he suppressed at one spot in the legal analysis reap-
peared in others. The First Amendment gives citizens an abso-
lute right of free speech. But what is "speech"? Is wearing a 
jacket inscribed with the words "Fuck the Draft," as a form of 
political protest? (Black said no.96) Is showing a pornographic 
movie, as a means of profit? (Black said yes.97) Is picketing? 
(Black said yes,9s sort of,99 and no.loo) Black drew a line be-
tween protected speech and unprotected conduct, but differenti-
ating between the two inevitably requires an exercise of 
judgment. 
91. Id. at 497. 
92. ld. 
93. ld. 
94. See Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 372 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting); Indiana ex 
reL Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 109 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting). But cf. El Paso v. 
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). 
95. Newman, Hugo Black at 371-72, 554-55 (cited in note 2). 
96. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971} (Black, J., dissenting). 
97. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (Black joining Douglas' concur-
rence). 
98. Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 
287, 302 (1941} (Black, J., dissenting). 
99. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (Black, J., writing for 
the Court}. 
100. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559,578 (1965) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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Attributing the grounds for judicial decisions to the will of 
others is a way of divesting the judiciary of responsibility for 
those decisions. If judges merely enforce the written commands 
laid down by the Framers of the Constitution and the democrati-
cally elected branches of Government, they can hardly be 
blamed when the outcome seems unjust, or illogical, or even con-
trary to the purpose of the legal text itself. They have a ready 
response: "I'm just doing what those fellows there told me to 
do." But that is no more accurate a description of what judges 
do-what they have always done, what Black himself did, and 
what they are supposed to do in our system-than Black's diffi-
dent description of himself as a hillbilly. 
Indeed, the confining textualism that Black sought then and 
Scalia seeks now to impose rests on an internal contradiction. 
Any decision to so narrow the judge's role-to make of her a 
mechanical linguist with a law degree-would itself be a very sig-
nificant exercise of judgment, by judges, to change our law. It is 
not supported by the texts before which the theory commands 
the judge to bow. Neither the Constitution nor any statute con-
tains what drafters of contracts call an "integration" clause, in-
structing the interpreter to limit herself to the words of the 
document in determining its meaning. Nor is such a change sup-
ported by our legal traditions. They, in fact, point in the opposite 
direction. Judges have always occupied a central role, in our 
common law system, in declaring what the law is. Legislators 
customarily enact vaguely worded statutes in the expectation that 
the courts will put meat on their bones. The "great generalities 
of the [C]onstitution," in Cardozo's phrase,101 likewise presup-
pose reasoned elaboration by the judiciary. 
Similarly, although Black urged strict adherence to the will 
of the Framers as expressed in the Constitution and their con-
temperaneous writings, he never made any historical showing 
that the Framers themselves agreed with this jurisprudential ap-
proach. In fact, the Framers were steeped in the tradition of 
English common law, which, in sharp contrast to the civil law 
system, tends to treat legal problems just as Black said they 
should not be treated: as "questions of reasonableness, proxim-
ity and degree."toz This same defect inheres in the "original in-
tent" school of constitutional interpretation: There is no good 
evidence that the original intent of the Framers was to bind fu-
101. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 17 (Yale U. Press, 
1921). 
102. Newman, Hugo Black at 492 (cited in note 2). 
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ture generations to interpret the Constitution in accordance with 
the Framers' original intent.to3 
So when an American judge says he cannot go beyond the 
words in front of him, he is really saying that he will not, and he 
is in this sense imposing his will to shape the law. Certainly this 
was true of Hugo Black. One supposes it is equally true of his 
more conservative jurisprudential disciples. There is no real es-
cape, in our legal system, from the judgment of judges declaring, 
modifying, and making sense of the legal principles by which we 
are governed. Our democratic traditions dictate that we recog-
nize that reality, not obscure it in the mist of a misleading 
formalism. 
103. See generally, H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original In-
tent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1985). 
